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I. INTRODUCTION
The Inter-American Treaty of Reciprocal Assistance' (Rio
Treaty) was signed on September 2, 1947 in Rio de Janeiro, but its
roots date back to the early 19th Century. The Treaty strength-
ened and developed the regional system for collective security that
was organized to stem the subversion of legitimate governments.
This development also carried over into the area of self-defense.
The United Nations Charter and the Rio Treaty sanction self-de-
fense only where aggression, in the form of an armed attack, has
occurred. Unfortunately, noncompliance by certain countries with
a resolution prohibiting relations with Cuba has led to the progres-
sive decline of the regional collective security system against sub-
version. The Treaty is thus in the midst of a grave crisis. This es-
say will first give a brief overview of the origins and development
of the Treaty, and then objectively examine the manifestations of
the crisis.
II. THE LATIN AMERICAN ROOTS OF THE RIO TREATY
Prior publications have examined the historical roots of the
Rio Treaty. Their purpose was to show the means by which Latin
America has contributed to the development of the modern sys-
tems of collective security such as the League of Nations, the
United Nations, and regional systems like the Rio Treaty and the
North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO). This essay will illus-
1. Inter-American Treaty of Reciprocal Assistance, Sept. 2, 1947, 62 Stat. 1681, T.IA.S.
No. 1838, 21 U.N.T.S. 77 [hereinafter cited as Rio Treaty].
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trate the historical constant that links Latin America's contribu-
tion to the development of the collective security system estab-
lished by the Rio Treaty and by the other inter-American security
mechanisms that preceded and complemented the Treaty.
The historical constant appeared in the early political and mil-
itary treaties signed by Latin American countries during the 19th
Century. The first of these treaties was the Treaty of Perpetual
Union, League, and Confederation (Treaty of Perpetual Union),
signed at the Panama Congress of 1826.2 At the 1826 Congress, Si-
mon Bolivar instructed the Peruvian pleni-potentiaries to "make
every effort to secure the great compact of union, league and per-
petual confederation against Spain, and against foreign rule."3 The
plenipotentiaries were also encouraged to vote for the adoption of
a declaration, similar to the Monroe Doctrine, that called for "the
European powers [to] abandon all ideas of further colonization of
this continent, and in opposition to the principle of intervention in
our domestic affairs."
4
Bolivar's concerns were incorporated into the Treaty of Per-
petual Union as illustrated by the content of articles 2 and 3 of the
Treaty:
Article 2. The object of this perpetual compact will be to main-
tain in common, defensively and offensively, should occasion
arise, the sovereignty and independence of all and each of the
confederated powers of American against foreign subjection, and
to secure to themselves from this time forward the enjoyment of
unalterable peace, and to promote in this behalf better harmony
and good understanding, as well, between the countries, citizens,
and subjects, respectively, as with the other powers with which
they should maintain or enter into friendly relations.
Article 3. The contracting parties obligate and bind themselves
to mutually defend themselves against every attack which shall
endanger their political existence, and to employ against the en-
emies of the independence of all or any of them all their influ-
2. Treaty of Perpetual Union, League, and Confederation, July 15, 1826, Colombia-
Central America-Peru-Mexico [herinafter cited as the Treaty of Perpetual Union]. INTERNA-
TIONAL CONFERENCES OF AMERICAN STATES, 1889-1928, at xxiv (J.B. Scott ed. 1931) [hereinaf-
ter cited as CONFERENCES, 1889-1928]. At the time of the signing Colombia consisted of the
present republics of Colombia, Ecuador, Panama, and Venezuela, and Central America con-
sisted of the present five Central American republics. F.V. GARcIA-AmADOR, THE INTER-
AMERICAN SYSTEM, PART 1, 8 (1983).
3. CONFERENCES, 1889-1928, supra note 2, at xxii.
4. Id. at xxiii.
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ence, resources, and naval and land forces, in the proportion
which, according to the separate convention of the same date,
each is bound to contribute to the maintenance of the common
cause.5
Other articles of the Treaty of Perpetual Union implemented
the mandate set forth in articles 2 and 3 and regulated different
aspects of the "collective security" system. Article 21, for example,
imposed a broad obligation of mutual assistance in order to
uphold and defend the integrity of their respective territories,
earnestly opposing any attempt of colonial settlement in them
* .*. . and to employ to this end, in common their forces and
resources if necessary.'
Article 10 of the Treaty of Perpetual Union expressly forbade the
contracting state to
make peace with common enemies of their independence with-
out including therein specifically all the other allies; in the intel-
ligence that in no case and under no pretext whatever, shall any
of the contracting parties accede in the name of the other to any
propositions not having basis the full and absolute recognition
of their independence. 7
Other plans for confederation were formulated by subsequent
congresses and embodied in other treaties. Subsequent treaties im-
plemented other aspects of the security system conceived by Boli-
var, such as the principle of solidarity against acts of aggression
contained in the Treaty of Confederation of 1845. These treaties
also reiterated the principle of solidarity in connection with the
commitment for reciprocal assistance. It should be noted that the
principle of solidarity, originally formulated in 1826, remains un-
changed even today because an act of aggression committed
against one member state is still considered an act of aggression
against all member states.
The Continental Treaty of 18568 and the Convention of
League and Alliance9 adopted broader definitions of the term "ag-
5. Treaty of Perpetual Union, supra note 2, art. 2 and 3.
6. Id. at 21.
7. Id., art. 10.
8. Continental Treaty of 1856, reprinted in F.V. GARCIA-AMADOR, THE INTER-AMERICAN
SYSTEM, PART 1, 19 (1983).
9. Convention of League and Alliance, July 18, 1856, Guatemala-Honduras-El Salvador,
115 Parry's T.S. 297.
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gression" that included acts of subversion. In the above agree-
ments, the signatories promised to prevent any type of internal
conspiracy or scheme against the established order of the state. In
1865, the Treaty of Union and Defensive Alliance e extended this
commitment for reciprocal assistance to acts of violence directed
against the internal regime of the signatories that would "establish
over it (the sovereign signatory) any superiority, right or preemi-
nence that would diminish or offend the full and complete exercise
of its sovereignty and independence.""'
It should be noted that even though the Latin American coun-
tries were concerned about acts of aggression originating from
within the American continent, including acts perpetrated by their
own expatriated nationals, the commitments to reciprocal assis-
tance were primarily motivated by the threat of invasion by Spain
and her European allies. In other words, the system of collective
security conceived by Bolivar, initiated in 1826 by the Treaty of
Perpetual Union and developed in subsequent treaties, arose
mainly to counteract extra-continental threats.
III. A UNITED STATES INITIATIVE: THE CONSULTATION PROCEDURE
By the last quarter of the 19th Century, Europe no longer
threatened Latin America. Thus, during the First International
Conference of American States, 2 called by the United States and
held in Washington, D.C. in 1889-90 the subject of the security of
the American continent was absent. Discussions focused on com-
merce and the peaceful settlement of controversies between Ameri-
can nations but never addressed the security issue. This conference
laid the foundation for the Inter-American System, the first re-
gional international organization. In 1936, President Franklin D.
Roosevelt convened the Inter-American Conference for the Main-
tenance of Peace in Buenos Aires, Argentina." The purpose of the
Buenos Aires conference was to study "the joint responsibility" of
the American states regarding matters related to the peace and se-
curity of the American continent. 4 This initiative resulted in a
10. Treaty of Union and Defense Alliance, Jan. 23, 1865, 130 Parry's T.S. 401. This
treaty was signed by Bolivia, Chile, Colombia, Ecuador, Peru, El Salvador, and Venezuela.
11. Id. at 402 (article IX of the Treaty).
12. See CONFERENCES, 1889-1928, supra note 2, at 3.
13. See INTERNATIONAL CONFERENCES OF AMERICAN STATES, 1933-1940, at 129 (Carnegie
Endowment for International Peace 1940) [hereinafter cited as CONFERENCES, SUPP. I].
14. Id.
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Declaration of Principles of Inter-American Solidarity and Cooper-
ation15 and in the Convention to Maintain, to Strengthen, and to
Re-establish Peace. 16 The Convention specifically provided that
the governments of the various American Republics were to con-
sult with each other in case the peace of one of them was
threatened. This consultation procedure rested on the principle of
solidarity originally enunciated in the Latin American Congresses
of the 19th Century. This principal was reformulated in the afore-
mentioned instruments as follows:
[E]very act susceptible of disturbing the peace of America af-
fects each and every one of them [the American republics], and
justifies the initiation of the Procedure of Consultation as pro-
vided for in the [c]onvention .... 
Following the 1936 Buenos Aires Conference, the principle of
solidarity and the consultation procedure were developed and
strengthened. In 1938 at the Eighth International Conference of
American States in Lima, Peru,18 both the principle of solidarity
and the commitment to consultation were reaffirmed "[iln case the
peace, security or territorial integrity of any American Republic is
thus threatened by acts of any nature that may impair them." 9
The First, Second, and Third Meetings of Consultation of
Ministers of Foreign Affairs were held in Panama in 1939, Havana
in 1940, and Rio de Janeiro in 1942.20 It should be noted that Res-
olution XV, entitled "Reciprocal Assistance and Cooperation for
the Defense of the Nations of the Americas," passed in Havana in
1940, included in the principle of solidarity
any attempt on the part of the non-American State against the
integrity or inviolability of the territory, the sovereignty or the
political independence of an American State.21 [Any such at-
tempt] shall be considered as an act of aggression against the
15. Id. at 160.
16. Id. at 188.
17. Id. at 160.
18. Id. at 215.
19. Id. at 309.
20. The final act of the First Meeting of Consultation is found in CONFERENCES, SUPP. I,
supra note 13, at 315. The final act and convention of the Second Meeting of the Consulta-
tion is found in the same volume beginning at page 343. The final act of the Third Meeting
of Consultation can be found in INTERNATIONAL CONFERENCES OF AMERICAN STATES, 1942-
1954, at 3 (Pan American Union 1958) [hereinafter cited as CONFERENCES, SUPP. II].
21. CONFERENCES, Supp. I, supra note 13, at 360.
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States which sign this declaration.22
Resolution I of the Third Meeting of Consultation, held in Rio
de Janeiro, reaffirmed the principle of solidarity as it had been for-
mulated in Havana.2" The principle of solidarity was used in Rio
de Janeiro as the basis for a resolution which called for severing
financial and commercial relations with the Axis powers and the
territories under their control,24 for a resolution which condemned
the Japanese aggression in Pearl Harbor,2 5 and for Resolution
XVII, entitled "Subversive Activities '26 which was the most impor-
tant resolution because it distinguished between
[a]cts of aggression of the nature contemplated in Resolution
XV adopted by the Second Meeting [of Consultation] and acts
of aggression of non-military character [which were] both pre-
liminary to and an integral part of a program of military
aggression.
This distinction was not intended to affect the applicability of ei-
ther the principle of solidarity or the procedure for consultation.
Both the principle and the procedure became the basic compo-
nents of the political defense system used against the extra-conti-
nental powers.
IV. THE SYSTEM FOR THE "POLITICAL DEFENSE" OF THE
AMERICAN CONTINENT: ITS APPLICATION TO NAZI-FASCIST
ACTIVITIES
The system for political defense, in effect, introduced an im-
portant aspect into the development of the regional system of col-
lective security. The system was founded upon a resolution passed
at the Buenos Aires Conference of 193628 which declared the need
for "the existence of a common democracy throughout America."29
The system was designed to counteract the danger posed by the
Nazi-Fascist ideologies and activities which threatened American
democratic institutions. This goal was supposed to be accom-
22. Id.
23. Id. at 11.
24. Id. at 19.
25. Id. at 34.
26. Id. at 25.
27. Id. at 25, 26.
28. See supra note 13 and accompanying text.
29. CONFERENCES, SUPP. I, supra note 13, at 160.
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plished through strengthening the internal security of the Ameri-
can countries. The system for political defense was actually insti-
tuted at the First Meeting of Consultation of 1939 and was further
developed during the Second and Third Meetings.
The origin and development of the system rested on the no-
tion that subversive activities which were incompatible with de-
mocracy were aided, directed, or instigated by extra-continental
powers, inspired by totalitarian ideologies, and constituted either
an "act of political aggression" or "aggression of a non-military
character." Resolution XVII of the Third Meeting of Consultation
and the Memorandum annexed to the Resolution so characterized
these subversive activities.30 Included in the description were activ-
ities such as the spread of propaganda, espionage, sabotage, public
disorder, and any other activities designed to affect the political
structure of a country.3 1
During the initial phase of the system, effective measures to
counteract the subversive activities were adopted at both the na-
tional and regional levels. At the national level, these measures in-
cluded domestic laws and decrees which regulated the traffic of
persons across state borders.2 Several noteworthy resolutions were
also adopted at the first three Meetings of Consultation with re-
spect to collective regional security measures. These resolutions
underscore the high level of solidarity and cooperation achieved by
the American states in the area of continental security.3 3 Also note-
worthy was the mammoth task performed in Montevideo by the
Emergency Advisory Committee for Political Defense during the
war. This committee extensively studied and coordinated the mea-
sures to be taken pursuant to Resolution XVII- 4 The committee
reported "on the necessary conditions to secure political defense,"
and concluded:
it is an indispensable condition to securing the best practical re-
30. CONFERENCES, SUPP. II, supra note 20, at 25.
31. Id.
32. See generally LEGISLACI6N PARA LA DEFENSA POLITICA DEL CONTINENTE (Union
Panamericana, Montevideo 1947).
33. For a review of the collective action taken pursuant to the resolutions adopted by
the Meetings of Consultation, see the Report of the Department of Legal Affairs of the
OAS's General Secretariat (prepared at the request of the Fourth Meeting); STRENGTHENING
OF INTERNAL SECURITY (Panamerican Union, Washington, D.C. 1953).
34. For a description of the work performed by the Emergency Advisory Committee for
Political Defense, see STRENGTHENING OF INTERNAL SECURITY (Panamerican Union, Washing-
ton, D.C. 1953).
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sults from the measures it recommends, that in all the American
countries there exists a genuine regime, free from faults and
weaknesses which would lower their resistance to the infiltration
and development of totalitarian regime.35
The political defense system did not lose its raison d'etre after
the defeat of the Axis power. Rather, the system reemerged in re-
sponse to the threat of subversive activities of international com-
munism. Furthermore, the system was integrated into the regional
system of collective security established by the Charter of the Or-
ganization of American States (OAS) and by the Rio Treaty.
V. IMMEDIATE ANTECEDENTS TO THE Rio TREATY: CHAPULTEPEC
AND SAN FRANCISCO
The Rio Treaty's collective security system incorporated sev-
eral important decisions made during the Inter-American Confer-
ence on the Problems of War and Peace, held in Chapultepec,
Mexico in 1945 (Chapultepec Conference). 6 The Chapultepec Con-
ference not only reaffirmed, but moreover, developed the principles
and procedures of the regional collective security system as evi-
denced by a declaration contained in the Final Act of the Confer-
ence which expanded the principle of solidarity. The principle of
solidarity established at Rio de Janeiro stated that any attack or
assault on the integrity or inviolability of the territory, or the sov-
ereignty or the political independence of an American state, would
be considered an act of aggression against all other states: In Reso-
lution VIII of the Final Act of the Chapultepec Conference, the
definitions of attack and assault were broadened to include acts of
aggression originating from within any of the American states.
This extension expanded the principle of solidarity to include in-
tra-continental activities.37
The Rio Treaty also incorporated some Dunbarton Oaks Pro-
posals (Proposals) which served as a basis for the United Nations
Charter, as well as provisions of the United Nations Charter itself,
adopted in 1945 at the San Francisco Conference. The Proposals
provided that matters relating to the maintenance of international
peace and security were dealt with either by state agencies or,
where appropriate, regional organizations. The Proposals prohib-
35. Id. at 9.
36. CONFERENCES, SupP. II, supra note 20, at 51.
37. Id. at 66. This resolution is entitled Reciprocal Assistance and American Solidarity.
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ited the regional organization from undertaking any "enforcement
action" without the prior approval of the Security Council.3 8 Addi-
tionally, the United Nations Charter provides that the permanent
members of the Security Council may veto any nation's use of
armed force. At San Francisco the Latin American countries in-
sisted on maintaining complete freedom of action within their own
regional collective security system. The United States, one of the
five permanent members of the Security Council, supported the
position of the Latin American Countries. As a result of these
events, the San Francisco Conference decided to include in the
United Nations Charter a provision to the effect that regional
agencies would be permitted to act, "in case of armed attack,"
without the prior authorization of the Security Council. These
same provisions recognize the "inherent right of individual and
collective self-defense."
The Rio Treaty, as well as the United Nations Charter, autho-
rizes the exercise of the right of self-defense only in cases where an
act of aggression constitutes an armed attack. Application of the
Treaty by the regional Organ of Consultation has nevertheless ex-
tended the scope of self-defense to other forms of aggression. It
should be emphasized that it was the firm stance of the Latin
American countries, later supported by the United States, which
prevented the drafters of the United Nations Charter from making
the inter-American collective security system an ineffective re-
gional system.
VI. SALIENT FEATURES OF THE REGIONAL COLLECTIVE SECURITY
SYSTEM
The historical process described in the preceding sections
culminated in the Inter-American Treaty for Reciprocal Assistance
signed in Rio de Janeiro in 1947.31 The Treaty incorporated the
principle of solidarity and the consultation procedure which were
essential to the development and strengthening of the regional col-
lective security system, from the time the Congress of Panama
convened in 1826, to the present. Some of these features are also
present in the Charter of the Organization of American States
38. See U.N. CHARTER art. 53, 1, infra note 68. For more information on the Dumbar-
ton Oaks Proposals, see L. GOODRICH, E. HAMBRO & A. SIMONS, CHARTER OF THE UNITED
NATIONS, COMMENTARY AND DOCUMENTS (3rd ed. 1969).
39. See supra, note 1. See also CONFERENCES, Supp. II, supra note 20, at 133.
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(OAS)40 signed in Bogota, Colombia in 1948.
The inter-American system provides for a competent regional
organ to take any action required for the purpose of self-defense.
In this instance, that organ is the Organ of Consultation. The Or-
gan is also authorized to take any other necessary measure for the
common defense or for the maintenance of peace and security on
the American continent. Finally, the Organ of Consultation is
given the authority to take the steps necessary for a peaceful reso-
lution of intra-continental problems.
The scope of the institution of self-defense differs among the
various inter-American instruments. Article 3 of the Rio Treaty
and article 51 of the United Nations Charter permit self-defense
measures only in cases of armed attack. The OAS Charter, how-
ever, allows measures of self-defense to be taken in response to
other forms of aggression, "an act of aggression that is not an
armed attack." It should again be pointed out that the Rio Treaty,
as well as the United Nations Charter, acknowledges "the inherent
right of individual or collective self-defense." Thus, the self-de-
fense measures agreed upon by the Organ of Consultation are
those taken collectively.
Individual self-defense consists of measures taken separately
either by the state or states directly when attacked, or measures
taken individually by one or more states when aiding another
state. In all cases, defensive measures can presently be taken until
the Organ of Consultation has rendered a decision on the matter.
Self-defense is also subject to the condition imposed by article 51
of the United Nations Charter that the United Nations Security
Council has not taken "the measures necessary to maintain inter-
national peace and security.' '41 Neither the Treaty nor the United
Nations Charter, however, clearly define when such measures are
considered to be "necessary."
Noteworthy is the juridical nature of the institution of self-
defense. Self-defense is framed in different terms in the two instru-
ments. While under the United Nations Charter self-defense is
only a right, under article 3 of the Treaty self-defense is both a
right and an obligation. The reason for the difference is that the
40. Charter of the Organization of American States, done Apr. 30, 1948, 2 U.S.T. 2394,
T.IA.S. No. 2361, 119 U.N.T.S. 48, as amended by Protocol of Buenos Aires, done Feb. 27,
1967, 21 U.S.T. 607, T.IAS. No. 6847, 721 U.N.T.S. 324 [hereinafter cited as the OAS
Charter].
41. U.N. CHARTER art. 51.
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Treaty is based on a commitment to reciprocal assistance. Recipro-
cal assistance is, in turn, based on the principle of solidarity. The
principle of solidarity, set out in article 27 of the OAS Charter
states:
[e]very act of aggression by a State against the territorial
integrity or the inviolability of territory or against the sover-
eignty or political independence of an American State shall be
considered an act of aggression against the other American
States.42
Self-defense, therefore, can not merely be a right, it must also be
an obligation. Alternatively, the United Nations Charter, as well as
traditional international law, considers self-defense to be only a
right. The differing conceptions of self-defense exist because the
inter-American collective security system, unlike the United Na-
tions system, is based on the principle of solidarity.
The two regional instruments are different with respect to the
authority that the Organ of Consultation has for taking measures
for the common defense and peace on the American continent. The
Rio Treaty specially provides for application of these measures
if the inviolability of the territory or the sovereignty or political
independence of any American State should be affected by an
aggression which is not an armed attack or by an extra-conti-
nental or intra-continental conflict, or by any other fact or situa-
tion that might endanger the peace of America.43
The OAS Charter not only includes all the above situations, but
also includes "armed attack" in its list of actionable incursions.
This difference reflects the fact that article 28 of the OAS Charter
provides for the application of collective self-defense measures.
The Organ of Consultation is authorized to take the following
measures:
[r]ecaU of chiefs of diplomatic missions; breaking off diplomatic
relations; breaking off consular relations; partial or complete in-
terruption of economic relations or of rail, sea, air, postal, tele-
graphic, telephonic and radiotelephonic or radiotelegraphic com-
munications; or use of armed force.
It should be noted that these measures may be agreed to by the
Organ of Consultation but not necessarily pursuant to article 6 of
42. OAS Charter, supra note 40, art. 27.
43. Rio Treaty, supra note 1.
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the Treaty. In addition, the Treaty provides that these measures
shall be binding upon all the signatory states.
Article 7 of the Rio Treaty provides for peaceful solutions to
intra-continental conflicts. Most regional and general collective se-
curity systems include similar provisions for such solutions. In the
Inter-American system, the method and the procedure for the
peaceful solution of conflicts are found in the GAS Charter and a
special treaty called the Pact of Bogota on Pacific Settlement
signed at the 1948 Conference in Bogota (Pact of Bogota).44 The
Rio Treaty itself applies only to the peaceful resolution of conflicts
arising among the states party to the Treaty, because the decisions
of the Organ of Consultation relating to the peaceful settlement of
conflicts are binding only to the parties who signed the Treaty.
In cases of armed conflict, article 7 of the Rio Treaty provides
that the Organ of Consultation must first call upon the contending
states to suspend hostilities and restore matters to the status quo
ante-bellum, or it may merely make a recommendation to the par-
ties in conflict. The Organ of Consultation shall also take any mea-
sures it deems necessary for the peaceful settlement of controver-
sies in order to restore inter-American peace and security. Article 7
concludes by stating that:
[t]he rejection of the pacifying action will be considered in the
determination of the aggressor and in the application of the
measures which the consultative meeting may agree upon.45
This last statement evidences the binding character that the orders
and any subsequent decisions rendered by the Organ of Consulta-
tion have on the states.
In view of the fact that the Rio Treaty is designed to maintain
peace and security in the region, some of the applications of article
7 are noteworthy. Article 7 was first applied during the conflict be-
tween Costa Rica and Nicaragua in 1948-49, and then again in
1955-56. The first phase of the conflict, 1948-49, was resolved
through the Pact of Amity signed by the two countries. The 1955-
56 phase of the conflict was settled when the two countries agreed
on the intervention of the Commission of Investigation and Concil-
iation as provided for in the Pact of Bogota. In both phases of the
conflict, the settlement was negotiated through the initiative and
44. Pact of Bogota on Pacific Settlement, Apr. 30, 1948, 30 U.N.T.S. 55. This treaty was
signed during the Ninth International Conference on American States. Id at 161.
45. Rio Treaty. supra note 1, art. 7.
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cooperation of the Council of the Organization, acting at the time
as the provisional Organ of Consultation.
Article 7 of the Rio Treaty was also used to solve the border
dispute between Honduras and Nicaragua, which concerned the
validity of an arbitration award given by the King of Spain in
1906. Through the application of the Treaty, both countries agreed
to take their dispute to the International Court of Justice and to
abide by that court's decision.
More recently, article 7 has been applied to the conflict be-
tween Honduras and El Salvador (the "Football War"). After a
long period of negotiation, the two countries agreed in a treaty to
submit their dispute to arbitration in order to resolve certain dif-
ferences which arose as a result of the armed conflict in 1969.
These above instances demonstrate article 7's effectiveness. 46
VII. APPLICABILITY OF THE Rio TREATY TO THE SUBVERSIVE
ACTIVITIES OF INTERNATIONAL COMMUNISM
The provisions of the Rio Treaty which define the acts, facts,
or the situations which justify its application are the most signifi-
cant features of the inter-American collective security system. The
Treaty allows self-defense only in cases of armed attack. In those
cases of collective action that do not involve self-defense, both arti-
cle 6 of the Treaty and article 28 of the OAS Charter contemplate
another form of aggression, "aggression which is not armed at-
tack," as well as any other "fact or situation that might endanger
the peace of America." Article 9 of the Treaty gives the Organ of
Consultation the authority to characterize other "acts" as "aggres-
sion." These provisions evidence the broad scope of the applicabil-
ity of the system. They also underscore the system's capability to
include acts which do not constitute an armed attack by expanding
the scope of the acts' definitional terms.
Applications of the Rio Treaty illustrate the Treaty's breadtfi,
especially its ability to counteract the subversive activities of ex-
tra-continental origin. The subversive activities of international
communism in the Western hemisphere began immediately after
World War II. Therefore, during the 1948 conference in Bogota
46. Regarding the applications of the Treaty mentioned in this section, see INTER-
AMERICAN TREATY OF RECIPROCAL AsSISTANcE APPLICATIONS (General Secretariat, OAS 3rd
ed. 1973). This three volume series covering the years 1948 to 1976 [hereinafter cited as
APPLICATIONS I, II, and III, respectively].
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that adopted the OAS Charter, the "interventionist character" of
the "political activities of International Communism or any other
totalitarian doctrines" were highlighted.17 The Tenth Inter-Ameri-
can Conference, held in Caracas in 1954, emphatically condemned
"[t]he activities of the international communist movement as con-
stituting an intervention in American affairs."4 In 1962, the Inter-
American Peace Committee submitted a report to the Eighth
Meeting of Consultation. This report characterized the subversive
activities of the Sino-Soviet and Cuban Governments in Latin
America as acts of "political aggression" or "aggression of non-mil-
itary character. ' 49 The report added:
[s]uch acts represent attacks upon inter-American peace and se-
curity as well as on the sovereignty and political independence
of the American states, and therefore a serious violation of fun-
damental principles of the Inter-American System. 50
For these reasons, the Organ of Consultation immediately sus-
pended the commercial trafficking of weapons and military equip-
ment to Cuba.51
The foregoing clearly illustrates that subversive action di-
rected, aided, or abetted by extra-continental powers and, in the
present day, the acts of American countries dominated by them,
constitute a special category of "act, fact or situation" described in
the OAS Charter and in the Rio Treaty as being "aggression which
is not an armed attack. ' 52 The above is corroborated by certain
pronouncements found in the report of the Investigating Commit-
tee of the Organ of Consultation regarding Venezuela's claim
against Cuba and the Resolution adopted in 1964 at the Ninth
Meeting of Consultation. The Report pointed out that
[t]he "acts of intervention" carried out by Cuba and outlines
therein "in particular, the shipment of arms, constitute a policy
of aggression on the part of the present government of Cuba
against the territorial integrity, the political sovereignty, and the
stability of the democratic institutions of Venezuela. [T]he Res-
olution of the Organ of Consultation declared "that acts verified
47. APPLICATIONS I, supra note 46, at 270.
48. CONFERENCES, SupP. II, supra note 20. at 433.
49. 67 INTER-AMERICAN SYSTEM 1, 114 (Inter-American Institute of International Legal
Studies 1966).
50. Id. at 115.
51. Id.
52. Id.
1985]
INTER-AMERICAN LAW REVIEW
by the Investigating Committee constitute an aggression and an
intervention on the part of the government of Cuba in the inter-
nal affairs of Venezuela, which affects all of the member states."
The second paragraph of the same resolution condemns the said
government "for its acts of aggression and of intervention
against the territorial inviolability, the sovereignty, and the po-
litical independence of Venezuela." Consequently, the Organ of
Consultation, in unequivocal terms, has designated these sub-
versive activities as acts of "aggression" covered by the perti-
nent provisions of the Rio Treaty.5 3
The characterization of subversive activities of extra-continen-
tal origin as an act of aggression is only the beginning of the pro-
cess which initiated the merger of the old system for "political de-
fense" and the inter-American system for collective security. The
adoption of mechanisms and procedures completed the merger of
these two systems. In 1962, the Eighth Meeting of Consultation
created the Special Consultative Committee on Security as an ad-
visory organ to the member states that desired assistance or infor-
mation on security matters. The Organ of Consultation met in
Washington, D.C. in 1964, and agreed on the application of the
measures enumerated in article 8 of the Rio Treaty54 to Cuba for
its intervention in Venezuela. The Special Committee which was
charged with maintaining a vigil over the situation prepared a
study for the Committee of the Council of Organization that
declared:
[t]he degree of development attained by the political-military
apparatus that has been established in Cuba is rendering the
system of security against subversion increasingly inadequate
and ineffective, based solely on the isolated measures that each
country might adopt.55
In the Committee's opinion, these events "constitute a situation of
such gravity and urgency that it can be adequately and effectively
dealt with only by adopting the measures provided for in the
Treaty."56
The importance of these developments cannot be underesti-
mated. Certainly they evidence the different disguises that mod-
ern-day aggression frequently adopts.
53. Id.
54. Rio Treaty, supra note 1, art. 8.
55. THE INTER-AMERICAN SYSTEM, supra note 49, at 164.
56. Id.
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VIII. SELF-DEFENSE AND THE SYSTEM FOR SECURITY AGAINST
SUBVERSION
The system for security against subversion of extra-continen-
tal origin, described in the previous section, was also merged into
the general collective security system in the area of self-defense.
Article 28 of the OAS Charter permits collective self-defense, not
only in cases of armed attack, but also in cases of "aggression that
is not an armed attack." 57 This does not assume that the drafters
of the OAS Charter intended to extend the scope of collective self-
defense to all forms of aggression. Rather, the drafters intended to
provide a basis for subsequent development of the institution of
self-defense. Through successive applications of the Rio Treaty,
the Organ of Consultation has not only broadened the scope of ar-
ticle 3, but also the scope of the responses to acts, facts, or situa-
tions that do not constitute an "armed attack."58
The mere "threat" of aggression is excluded from the explicit
language of the United Nations Charter and the Rio Treaty provi-
sions dealing with self-defense. During the so-called "October Cri-
sis" of 1962, the OAS Council, sitting as the Provisional Organ of
Consultation, was motivated to act in the absence of an "armed
attack", because the situation could, at any moment, have become
"an effective threat to the peace and security of the Continent.""9
This "threat" was the Soviet Union's installation of intermediate
and medium range nuclear missiles in Cuba. These missiles were
effectively at the disposal of an extra-continental power, the Soviet
Union. The situation for self-defense during the Cuban missile cri-
sis was unique. The measures taken by the Organ of Consultation
at this time, however, demonstrated that individual or collective
self-defense can effectively counteract the threat of an armed
attack.60
The Organ of Consultation's various applications of the Treaty
have extended the scope of individual and collective self-defense to
cover instances of subversive activities that are directly or indi-
rectly through intermediary countries in the region, orchestrated,
aided or abetted by extra-continental powers. In Resolution II
57. See Supra p. 14.
58. See supra p. 13.
59. THE INTER-AMERICAN SYSTEM, supra note 49, at 164.
60. For a brief summary of the activities of the Organ of Consultation during the "Oc-
tober Crisis" see id. at 164.
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passed at the Eighth Meeting of Consultation in 1962, the Organ of
Consultation recommended that member states
[t]ake those steps that they may consider appropriate for their
individual and collective self-defense, and to cooperate, as may
be necessary or desirable, to strengthen their capacity to
counteract threats or acts of aggression, subversion, or other
dangers to peace and security resulting from the continued in-
tervention in this hemisphere of Sino-Soviet powers, in accor-
dance with the obligations established in treaties and agree-
ments such as the Charter of the Organization of American
States and the Inter-American Treaty of Reciprocal
Assistance.6 1
This third paragraph of Resolution II served as the basis for the
pronouncements made by the Foreign Ministers at the close of the
informal meeting held in Washington, D.C., October 2, 1962. In
Washington, the foreign ministers stated:
the Soviet Union's intervention in Cuba threatens the unity of
the Americas and its democratic institutions, and that this inter-
vention has special characteristics which, pursuant to paragraph
3 of Resolution II of the Eighth Meeting of Consultation of Min-
isters of Foreign Affairs, called for the adoption of special mea-
sures, both individual and collective.62
This statement reflects the Foreign Ministers' view that the peculi-
arity of the Soviet's actions required and justified recourse to col-
lective and individual self-defense measures described in para-
graph 3 of Resolution 11 (1962). Self-defense was warranted even
though the Cuban threat was not the type of aggression provided
for in article 3 of the Rio Treaty.
During the Ninth Meeting of the Consultation in 1964, the ex-
panded scope of self-defense was developed and perfected even
further. In paragraph 5 of Resolution I it was resolved
[t]o warn the Government of Cuba that if it should persist in
carrying out acts that possess characteristics of aggression and
intervention against one or more of the member states of the
Organization, the member states shall preserve their essential
rights as sovereign states by the use of self-defense in either in-
dividual or collective form, which could go so far as resort to
armed force, until such time as the Organ of Consultation takes
61. Id. at 164.
62. Id.
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measures to guarantee the peace and security of the
hemisphere.6 3
In comparison to Resolution II passed at the Eighth Meeting, the
1964 Resolution is more precise as to the issue of extending the
scope of self-defense in certain cases. In addition, while Resolution
II was specifically limited to "obligations established in treaties
and agreements," '64 Resolution I of 1964 contained only one limita-
tion; that the exercise of self-defense be subordinated to any action
taken by the Organ of Consultation to restore peace and security
in the hemisphere.6 5 Moreover, Resolution I explicitly referred to
the use of "armed force" as a concrete measure to be taken in the
exercise of self-defense. 6
The importance of the foregoing resolutions of the Organ of
Consultation can hardly be emphasized. While measures contem-
plated in article 6 of the Rio Treaty6 7 are subject to the limitations
of article 53 of the United Nations Charter regarding the use of
armed force, both individual and collective self-defense measures
are not so limited because they do not require approval of the
United Nations Security Council."6 This is especially significant
because the approval of the Security Council requires the unani-
mous vote of its permanent members.
IX. RECENT APPLICATIONS OF THE SYSTEM: THE RESOLUTIONS
REGARDING THE TRI-CONTINENTAL CONFERENCE OF HAVANA
The Eighth Meeting of the Organ of Consultation (Eighth
Meeting) was held in Punta del Este, Uruguay in 1962. The Coun-
cil of the Organization asked the Eighth Meeting to closely watch
over the region in order to prevent threats or acts of aggression,
subversion, or other dangers to peace and security resulting from
the continued intervention in this hemisphere by Sino-Soviet pow-
ers. The Council was also asked to make the appropriate recom-
mendations to the governments of the member-states .6 The Coun-
63. Id. at 169. See also id. for the entire text of Resolution I.
64. Id. at 164.
65. Id. at 169. See Resolution I.
66. Id.
67. Rio Treaty, supra, note 1, art. 6.
68. Article 53 states in part: "[N]o enforcement action shall be taken under regional
arrangements or by regional agencies without the authorization of the Security Council."
U.N. CHARTER, art. 53.
69. Resolution II of the Eighth Meeting of Consultation states in paragraph 2 that the
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cil carried out this mandate on February 2, 1966, a few days after
the conclusion of the Tri-Continental Conference held in Havana.
This conference is formally known as the First Afro-Asian-Latin
American Peoples Solidarity Conference (Peoples Conference).
The Council appointed a special committee (Committee) to study
the deliberations, conclusion and projections of the Tri-Continen-
tal Conference. The Committee submitted its report (Report) to
the Council at the end of 1967.70
On February 7, 1967, the United Nations Latin American
Group addressed a letter to the President of the Security Council
denouncing a General Declaration made at the Tri-Continental
Conference. The letter stated that the Declaration constituted the
"first deliberate violation"7' of a declaration made by the General
Assembly of the United Nations. The declaration read:
[n]o State shall organize, assist, foment, finance, incite or toler-
ate subversive, terrorist or armed activities directed towards the
violent overthrow of the regime in another State, or interfere in
civil strife in another State.7 2
In effect, the Havana General Declaration proclaimed, inter alia:
the right and the duty of the countries of Asia, Africa, Latin
America and of the States of Progressive Governments of the
world to make available materials and moral support for those
people who fight for their liberty or who suffer direct or indirect
aggression by imperialist powers. 3
The Latin American Group asked the Security Council to circulate
their letter as an official council document. The Council, however,
refrained from taking any formal action on the substance of the
matter.
The Committee thoroughly examined every aspect of the Tri-
Continental Conference, as demonstrated by the vast amount of
Meeting resolves: "To direct the Council of the Organization to establish a Special Consult-
ative Committee on Security composed of experts on security matters..." APPLICATIONS II,
supra note 46, at 69.
70. Report of the Special Committee to Study Resolution 11 and VIII of the Eighth
Meetings [sic] of Consultation of Ministers of Foreign Affairs on the First Afro-Asian-
Latin American Peoples' Solidarity Conference and its Projections, O.A.S./Ser.G./IV c-i-
769/ Vols. I & II, (1966) [hereinafter cited as Report I or Report I1].
71. Report II, supra note 70, at 280.
72. G.A. Res. 2131, 20 U.N. GAOR Supp. (No. 14) at 11, U.N. Doc. A/6014 (1965). This
resolution is entitled: Declaration on the Inadmissibility of Intervention in the Domestic
Affairs of States and the Protection of Their Independence.
73. Report II, supra note 70, at 280.
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information gathered in the Report. The Committee also offered a
series of important recommendations and conclusions. The Report
stated that at the Tri-Continental Conference an agreement was
reached "for providing aid to subversive and armed movements in
the three continents." 74 The Report also stated that the Cuban
Government
has officially assumed its responsibility in the activities carried
on from the capital [Havana] by the new organizations of the
international communist movement to overthrow independent
governments of member States of the Organization of American
States and the United Nations. 6
The Committee also made special note of "the gravity of this
conclusion. '7
6
In a further reference to the responsibility of the Cuban Gov-
ernment, the Committee concluded that the Cuban Government
[c]ontinues to be the principal focus and agent in the subversive
and interventionist campaign sponsored by the communist pow-
ers against member states of the Organization of American
States. To carry out this mission Cuba enjoys not only the polit-
ical support of the Tri-Continental Organization, but also the
special protection and aid of the Soviet Union, which provides it
with military and economic assistance. 77
These facts led the Committee to conclude that:
There is no doubt that subversion and communist revolutionary
warfare, with their entire range of activities, has constituted and
continues to be a real danger in the hemisphere. But now these
operations can be conducted with greater effectiveness, in view
of the establishment of the Tri-Continental Organization
(AALAPSO), the Latin American Solidarity Organization
(LASO) and their mechanisms for aid and coordination, serving
together with the Government of Cuba as agents carrying out
the will of the international communist powers.7s
Towards the end of 1966, the Council of the Organization consid-
ered the Committee's Report. On November 28, 1966, the Council
resolved that the member-states adopt all measures that were nec-
74. Report I, supra note 70, at 91.
75. Id.
76. Id.
77. Id. at 92.
78. Id. at 93.
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essary to counteract the interventionist politics and aggression
which resulted from the Tri-Continental Conference. These mea-
sures were to be used against any permanent organization created
by the Tri-Continental Conference. Additionally, the Committee
was asked to inform the Council of these organizations' future ac-
tivities, "with the firm purpose of maintaining strict vigilance over
hemispheric security. 1 7
9
The constitution and projections of the Tri-Continental Con-
ference were re-examined the following year at the Twelfth meet-
ing of the Consultation of Ministers of Foreign Affairs. The meet-
ing was requested by the Venezuelan Government because of
[t]he attitude of the present government of Cuba which is carry-
ing out a policy of persistent intervention in their (member
states') internal affairs with violation of their sovereignty and
integrity, by fostering and organizing subversive and terrorist
activities in their territory of various states, with the deliberate
aim of destroying the principles of the inter-American system.80
Rather than applying the Rio Treaty, the Council of the Organiza-
tion convened the Meeting of Consultation pursuant to the Char-
ter of the OAS. During the first stage of the session two commit-
tees were created. One committee (Venezuela Committee) was
responsible for making the necessary investigations in Venezuela
regarding that country's accusations and denunciations of Cuba.
The other committee (Tri-Continental Committee) was charged
with reporting the events of the Tri-Continental Conference that
had occurred since the report of November 26, 1966.1
The Venezuela Committee's first report stated:
[I]t is clear that the present Government of Cuba continues to
give moral and material support to the Venezuelan guerrilla and
terrorist movement and that the recent series of aggressive acts
against the government of Venezuela is part of the Cuban gov-
ernment's continuing policy of persistent intervention in the in-
ternal affairs of other American states by fostering and organiz-
ing subversive and terrorist activities in their territories.2
The Tri-Continental Committee's report stated that the Tri-Conti-
79. Id. at viii.
80. Twelfth Meeting of Consultation of Ministers of Foreign Affairs, Final Act at 1,
O.A.S./Ser. C./fI.12 (1968) [hereinafter cited as Twelfth Meeting].
81. Id. at 7.
82. Id. at 7-8.
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nental Conference held in Havana was
a further step in the efforts of communism and other subversive
forces in the hemisphere to promote, support, and coordinate
guerrilla, terrorist, and other subversive activities in our
hemisphere . 3
When the Meeting resumed in September, it made several pro-
nouncements based on the reports of the two committees. It
resolved
[t]o condemn emphatically the present government of Cuba for
its repeated acts of aggression and intervention against Vene-
zuela and for its policy of intervention in the internal affairs of
Bolivia and of other American states, through the incitement
and active and admitted support of armed bands and other sub-
versive activities directed against the governments of those
states.8 4
In addition, the Meeting urged those countries who were not mem-
bers of the OAS to curb their commercial and financial dealings
with Cuba, as well as to restrict their air and marine travel to that
country. The Meeting recommended that the member-states, indi-
vidually and collectively, repeat this recommendation to the non-
member states. With respect to the Tri-Continental Conference,
the Meeting urged member-states to strictly adhere to their recom-
mended sanctions against Cuba as recorded in the Committee's
Report. The member-states were also encouraged to prevent the
entry or exit of men, arms or equipment from Cuba, that were in-
tended for purposes of subversion or aggression, by adopting or in-
tensifying measures of vigilance and control over their respective
coastlines and borders. Neighboring member-states were asked to
coordinate security and information systems to counteract these
activities.8 5
The Meeting also recommended
[t]o the member states of the Organization of American States
that they bring to the attention of the competent organ of the
United Nations the acts of the present Government of Cuba
that contravene the provisions cited in resolution 2131 (XX) of
the General Assembly.8
83. Id. at 8.
84. Id. at 8-9.
85. Id. at 9.
86. Id. at 12.
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X. DECLINE OF THE SYSTEM: NONCOMPLIANCE WITH THE DECISION
OF THE ORGAN OF CONSULTATION PROHIBITING THE MAINTENANCE
OF RELATIONS WITH CUBA
The previous two sections illustrate how the inter-American
system for collective security was developed and strengthened
through plans designed to counteract the action of international
communism, especially those activities carried out by and through
the Cuban government. After the above applications of the Rio
Treaty by the Permanent Council, and the adoption of Resolution
I at the Twelfth Meeting of Consultation, the Treaty went into a
period of progressive decline. This decline ultimately led to the cri-
sis in which the Treaty finds itself today.
The progressive decline of the system was initiated by Mex-
ico's refusal to comply with the binding decision of the Organ of
Consultation's 1964 decision prohibiting member-states from
maintaining relations with Cuba. The reason Mexico gave for ig-
noring the decision was that the Rio Treaty "[did] not envisage in
any part the application of such measures in situations of the kind
and nature dealt with by this Meeting of Consultation. 87 Other
member-states opposed the measures adopted by the Organ of
Consultation. Nonetheless, these states declared that they would
honor the obligations imposed by the Rio Treaty and, moreover,
that they would abide and comply with the decisions of the Organ
of Consultation.
Nevertheless, noncompliance by Mexico and by other mem-
ber-states in the early 1970s is but one reason for the Treaty's de-
clining effectiveness. Ultimately, noncompliance with the measures
imposed against Cuba goes only to the individual state's responsi-
bility with respect to the provisions of the Treaty. A graver prob-
lem arose with regard to the fact that the initial and subsequent
acts of individual noncompliance were carried out with impunity.
It is of no import that neither the Rio Treaty nor the OAS Charter
explicitly stated what actions were to be taken by the organs of the
OAS in this situation, given the fact that neither of these instru-
ments explicitly authorized actions that have been made by the
Organ of Consultation."s
87. APPLICATIONS II, supra note 40, at 218-9.
88. Every international organization, as well as every state, enjoys "implicit" or "inher-
ent" powers. In the opinion of the International Court of Justice: "Under international law,
the Organization [of the United Nations] must be deemed to have those powers which,
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The OAS's responsibility for member-states' noncompliance
with the decisions of the Organ of Consultation and the resultant
decline of the regional system for security against subversion has
also been evidenced by the procedure for admitting new member-
states. On the one hand, the OAS has accepted new member-states
into the Organization without requiring them to ratify the Rio
Treaty. Acceptance of the Treaty is implicitly required by both the
text and the legislative history of article 6 of the OAS Charter. 9
On the other hand, Jamaica was recently admitted even though it
maintained diplomatic and commercial relations with Cuba. This
is especially significant in view of the fact that at the time that
Jamaica was admitted the problem was formally raised and amply
discussed by the competent organs.
The OAS assumed the same attitude in another closely related
situation. On October 13, 1972, the Prime Ministers of the new
member-states plus Guyana, which at that time was not a member-
state, sent a note to the Secretary General of the OAS. 0 This note
stated that because the English speaking Caribbean nations were
not members of the OAS at the time the Meeting of Consultation
was convened in 1964 they had not been represented by the Organ-
ization, they therefore were not bound to follow the organization's
acts. Although the representatives of the member-states were made
aware of the contents of the note and its attached declaration, no
organ of the OAS undertook serious discussions regarding the im-
pact of this note, even though the Prime Ministers of the new
member-states seriously questioned the validity of the decision
rendered by the Organ of Consultation.
The acts of noncompliance with the decisions of the Organ of
though not expressly provided in the Charter, are conferred upon it by necessary implica-
tions as being essential to the performance of its duties." Reparation for Injuries Suffered in
the Service of the United Nations, 1949 I.C.J. 174, 182.
89. Rio Treaty, supra note 1, art. 6.
90. The note was a letter from the Prime Ministers of Barbados, Guyana, Jamaica, and
Trinidad and Tobago to His Excellency Dr. Galo Plaza, Secretary General of the Organiza-
tion of American States (Oct. 13, 1972). The letter was accompanied by a declaration which
stated in part-
The independent English-speaking Caribbean States, exercising their sover-
eign right to enter into relations with any other sovereign State, and pursuing
their determination to seek regional solidarity and to achieve meaningful and
comprehensive economic cooperation amongst all Caribbean countries, will seek
the early establishment of relations with Cuba, whether economic or diplomatic
or both...
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Consultation culminated when the Organ itself rendered virtually
ineffective the measures agreed upon in 1964. Given the close rela-
tionship between noncompliance and the amendments made to the
Treaty just before the last act of noncompliance, the nature of the
amendments should first be examined.
XI. FURTHER DECLINE OF THE SYSTEM: THE AMENDMENT To
THE Rio TREATY
During its third regular session, held in Washington, D.C. in
1973, the OAS General Assembly, finding that there was a "general
dissatisfaction with the functioning and results of the inter-Ameri-
can system," '91 passed a resolution creating a Special Commission
(CEESI), composed of representatives of the member-states. The
CEESI was responsible for analyzing the structure and operation
of the inter-American system and for recommending changes in
the structure of the system. The CEESI was specifically instructed
that the new system should adequately respond to "the new politi-
cal, economic, social, and cultural situations in all the member
states and to hemisphere and world conditions."9 To this end, the
CEESI studied both the Rio Treaty and the OAS Charter. Later it
submitted its report to the various governments. The report con-
tained a project of amendments which followed the purposes im-
plicit in the General Assembly's mandate.9 3 The amendments were
incorporated into the Protocol of Amendment to the Rio Treaty
(Protocol), which was signed in San Jose, Costa Rica in 1975.9'
The purpose behind the General Assembly's mandate to the
CEESI was reflected in the Protocol's language. The Preamble es-
poused the necessity for guaranteed peace and security among the
American states, with the guarantee to be embodied in "an instru-
ment that is in accordance with the history and principles of the
inter-American system." '95 The Protocol specifically pointed out
that these principles included "the principle of nonintervention as
well as the right of all states to choose freely their political, eco-
91. Final Report to the Governments of the Member States Vol. XII OEA/Ser. P.
CEESI/doc. 26/75 Rev. 1 (1975), p. 95. [hereinafter cited as Final Report].
92. Id. at 96.
93. See generally Id.
94. Protocol? of Amendment to the Inter-American Treaty of Reciprocal Assistance,
OEA/Ser. A/1.Add. (1975) [hereinafter cited as the Protocol].
95. Id. at 1.
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nomic, and social organization."96 The CEESI report stated that its
objective was "to readjust that complex treaty, insofar as possible,
to the realities of our times. '97
The amendments suggested by the Protocol had the greatest
impact on the nature of acts of aggression or other facts or situa-
tions which would justify recourse to the Treaty system. By virtue
of one amendment, the phrase, "aggression which is not an armed
attack," was deleted from article 6 of the Treaty.98 No similar
phrase was inserted in its place. This eliminated any terminology
that would explicitly and unequivocally characterize indirect ag-
gression or subversion as being an act which would justify the ap-
plication of the Rio Treaty. Moreover, the change made to article
999 of the Treaty prevented the Organ of Consultation from char-
acterizing subversion as an act of aggression. As amended, article 9
identifies only acts involving the use of armed force as being acts
of aggression. In addition, the power of the Organ of Consultation
is constrained to merely
determine that other specific cases submitted to it for considera-
tion, equivalent in nature and seriousness to those contemplated
in this article, constitute aggression under the provisions of the
Charter of the United Nations [and] the Charter of the Organi-
zation of the American States.100
The Charter of the United Nations does not provide for a pro-
cedure to follow in cases of indirect aggression. As for the Charter
of the OAS, the change made to article 9 of the Treaty presumed
that a similar change would be made to article 28 of the Charter.' 0'
The Reporter of the General Committee of the San Jose Con-
ference was of the opinion that the general expression "aggression
which is not an armed attack" was "subject to repeated criticism
since it was a concept within the Rio Treaty that admitted a broad
interpretation."0 2 The argument was repeatedly made that be-
cause the aforementioned expression was vague, it could result in
the application of the Rio Treaty for purely political or ideological
96. Id.
97. Final Report, supra note 91, at 4.
98. The Protocol renumbered article 6 of the Inter-American Treaty of Reciprocal Sys-
tem making it article 5. See Protocol, supra note 94, art. 1 at 5.
99. Id. at 5-7.
100. Id.
101. See supra p. 14.
102. F.V. GARCIA-AMADOR, THE INTER-AMERICAN SYSTEM, PART 2, 383 (1983).
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reasons, to the detriment of some of the states. Actually, this view
was echoed during the CEESI deliberations and during the Confer-
ence in which the Protocol was drafted. The principles of noninter-
vention and self-determination were also associated with this argu-
ment. These principles were expressed in a new article 12 to the
Treaty which stated:
Nothing stipulated in this Treaty shall be interpreted as limit-
ing or impairing in any way the principle of non-intervention
and the right of all States to choose freely their political, eco-
nomic, and social organization. 0 3
In addition, the San Jose Protocol contained other changes
which indirectly affected the inter-American system for security
against subversion. For example, an amendment to article 5 of the
Treaty reduced the majority required to render ineffective any
measures adopted pursuant to article 8 of the Treaty.104
Another change affected the right of the states to resort to the
United Nations in certain situations. 05
XII. ACTION OF THE ORGAN OF CONSULTATION IN SAN JOSE
The progressive decline of the inter-American system for se-
curity against communist subversion led to a crisis during the first
half of the 1970s. In 1971 the Peruvian Government stated to the
OAS Permanent Council that it wished that the organization
would reconsider the policy of Cuban isolation which began in 1964
with the Organ of Consultation's decision to impose sanctions on
that country. The Peruvian government wanted the Cuban issue
re-evaluated in light of the positive East-West relations, the recog-
nition of Communist China's representation in the United Nations,
and President Nixon's projected trip to that country. °10 Peru's pro-
posed resolution was discussed in a private session of the General
Committee of the Permanent Council. This group later stated that
"the American States [will be] free to renew their diplomatic, con-
sular, and commercial relations with the Government of Cuba in
exercise of their sovereignty and their respective national inter-
ests. ' 10 7 The Peruvian representative made it clear that it was not
103. Protocol, supra note 94, art. 1 at 8.
104. See Protocol, supra note 94, art. 1 at 7.
105. See id. at 5-7.
106. See the Washington, D.C. United Press International Release of Dec. 7, 1971.
107. See the Washington, D.C. United Press International Release of Dec. 11, 1971.
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his country's intention to end the 1964 sanctions against Cuba.
Rather, Peru wanted a new juridical procedure which would per-
mit, but not require, the member-states to renew their relations
with Cuba. Although the Peruvian initiative met with little success
in 1971, Peru tried again in 1972 by requesting a special meeting of
the Permanent Council. The 1972 Peruvian proposal did not differ
from the 1971 proposal, as it called for the normalization of rela-
tions with Cuba to the extent that each member-state deemed ap-
propriate. In addition, the proposal stated that it would not be
considered a pronouncement on the validity of Resolution I
adopted by the Organ of Consultation in 1964. The special repre-
sentative from Peru insisted on the same arguments used the pre-
vious year. It was argued that the special circumstances in 1964
had changed; that the ideological and political pluralism were a ne-
cessity within the system; and that the security of the hemisphere
would be strengthened if coercive measures were replaced by a pol-
icy of unification. 10 8
The majority of the member-states agreed to discuss the pro-
posed resolution even though they did not share Peru's position.
Although the fourth paragraph of Resolution I of the 1964 meeting
gave the Council of the Organization the power to discontinue the
measures adopted in Resolution I, it was obvious that the Peruvian
proposal implicitly revoked the resolution. 10 9 The Council's power
to revoke the Resolution was conditioned on the Cuban Govern-
ment having "ceased to constitute a danger to the peace and secur-
ity of the hemisphere." 110 Under the terms of the resolution, revo-
cation by the Council required the approval of two-thirds of the
member-states. Extensive deliberations by the General Committee
and the Permanent Council resulted in the rejection of the resolu-
tion: thirteen voted against adoption, seven voted for adoption,
and three abstained.""
In 1974, the Governments of Colombia, Costa Rica, and Vene-
zuela renewed efforts to normalize diplomatic, consular, and com-
mercial relations with Cuba. This time, the governments requested
the convocation of the Fifteenth Meeting of Consultation of Minis-
108. See Act of the Extraordinary Session of the Permanent Council of May 31, 1972,
OEA/Ser. G, CP/ACTA 73/72.
109. See supra p. 18.
110. APPLICATIONS II, supra note 46, at 216.
111. See generally Act of the Extraordinary Session of the Permanent Council of May
31, 1972 OEA/Ser. G, CP/ACTA 73/72 and Act of the Extraordinary Session of the Perma-
nent Council of June 13, 1972 OEA/Ser. G, CP/ACTA 75/72.
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ters of Foreign Affairs pursuant to the Rio Treaty. The reason for
the meeting was "the change in circumstances that existed in
1964."112 This was also the reason given by the Permanent Council
on September 20, 1974, when it adopted a resolution calling for the
Meeting of Consultation.'13 The Fifteenth Meeting of Consultation
was held in Quito, Ecuador in November 1974. Colombia's, Costa
Rica's and Venezuela's calls for a blanket repeal of the 1964 Reso-
lution I (the tripartite draft resolution) reflected a very different
approach to the normalization of relations from that exemplified in
Peru's 1971 and 1972 proposals. While the tripartite draft Resolu-
tion did not obtain the required majority of fourteen votes, 114 the
delegations from these three countries, as well as from nine other
countries that had voted in favor of the draft resolution, formu-
lated a declaration which was read at the close of the meeting. The
declaration stated that the sanctions imposed on Cuba had become
anachronistic, ineffective, and inadvisable, because they had been
imposed "under political conditions totally different from those
that prevail in the world today." 16 The twelve delegations which
signed this declaration also pressed their dissatisfaction with the
"absurd" voting procedure established in the Rio Treaty not only
because it permitted a minority of states to seriously compromise
the authority of the Treaty, but also because the Organization of
American States, "having as a result that other states may join, as
will probably happen, those who have reestablished relations with
Cuba, as they do not feel compelled to respect Resolution I as it
lacks the backing of a majority of American states.""' 6
The final act of the Fifteenth Meeting of Consultation also in-
cluded declarations separately formulated by three of the nine
delegations which opposed the revocation of Resolution I of 1964.
The Brazilian delegation was of the opinion that the decision to
discontinue the measures adopted should be based upon the con-
duct of the Cuban government. Brazil's delegation found signifi-
cant the fact that the Cuban government had not indicated that it
wished to have the sanctions lifted and was not disposed to stop its
interventionist activities." 7 In their declarations, the Chilean and
112. Note of Sept. 6, 1974, OEA/Ser. G, CP/doc. 350 (1974).
113. Resolution of the Council of Sept. 20, 1974, OEA/Ser. G, CP/doc. 350 (1974).
114. Fifteenth meeting of Consultation of Ministers of Foreign Affairs at 27, OEA/Ser.
C/1.15 (1974) [hereinafter cited as Fifteenth Meeting].
115. Id. at 12.
116. Id.
117. Id. at 15-18.
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Uruguayan delegations also noted the interventionist activities of
the Cuban government. The Uruguayan Foreign Minister insisted
on admission of this fact, and emphasized that his government had
provided sufficient proof of these activities. Moreover, in his view,
the only basis to contradict the accuracy of Uruguay's proof was to
withstand the reports found in the United States newspapers
which stated that the threat of Cuban interventions had all but
disappeared. The Foreign Minister also pointed out that nobody at
the Fifteenth Meeting explicitly stated that Cuba had ceased to be
a threat to the peace and security of the American continent. He
concluded by reiterating the Brazilian delegation's view that the
Cuban government had not made any gesture or move that would
indicate a substantial change in its conduct.l 8
The failure of the Fifteenth Meeting of Consultation to reach
an agreement led to the convocation of a new Meeting of Consulta-
tion, held in San Jose, Costa Rica in July, 1975. This Meeting was
also convened pursuant to the Rio Treaty at the request of ten
states, in order to examine a matter which was "of an urgent na-
ture and of the common interest" to the American states, namely,
the "freedom of action of the states to the Inter-American Treaty
of Reciprocal Assistance to restore to normal their relations with
Cuba at the level and in the form deemed advisable by each." 119
Interestingly, the manner in which these ten countries chose to
normalize relations with Cuba was the same as the manner the
government of Peru proposed in 1971 and 1972. It should be noted
that this Meeting, because it was convened pursuant to the Rio
Treaty, had the authority to revoke Resolution I of 1964, and to
discontinue the measures adopted by the Organ of Consultation in
1964.
A few months before the Meeting of Consultation was to con-
vene, the United States Assistant Secretary of State for Inter-
American Affairs suggested that the problem of Cuban sanctions
might be resolved through an interim accord which would give the
countries the liberty to reestablish diplomatic relations with
Cuba.120 In accordance with the Council's convocation, the Meeting
118. Id. at 21-24.
119. APPLICATIONS III, supra note 46, at 81.
120. The Assistant Secretary was referring to the Conference on the proposed amend-
ments to the Rio Treaty, which was to be held in San Jose. It was hoped that the Confer-
ence would result in an interim agreement dealing with the problems associated with the
measures applied to Cuba in 1964. See the Washington, D.C. United Press International
Release of May 21, 1977.
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of Consultation examined the issue of normalization of relations
with Cuba exactly as it had been conceived by the ten countries
requesting the meeting.
During the deliberations of the Organ of Consultation, these
ten countries were joined by Honduras in presenting the draft res-
olution that was later approved by the eleven countries, as well as
El Salvador, the United States, and the Dominican Republic.
Chile, Paraguay and Uruguay ultimately voted against the resolu-
tion, while Brazil and Nicaragua abstained. The pertinent provi-
sion of the resolution left
the stated parties to the Rio Treaty free to normalize or con-
duct, in accordance with the national policy and interest of each,
their relations with the Republic of Cuba at the level and in the
form that each State [deemed] advisable. 121
It is not difficult to perceive the true scope of this resolution.
From a legal standpoint, the measures agreed on by the Organ of
Consultation in 1964 were not discontinued and Resolution I itself
was not revoked. Instead, an altogether new resolution was
adopted which would function on the fringes of Resolution I. This
new resolution gave the parties to the Rio Treaty the freedom to
normalize and conduct relations with Cuba. It is an understate-
ment to note that the two resolutions are juridically inconsistent.
While the San Jose resolution authorizes relations with Cuba, the
1964 Resolution prohibits any formal contact. Thus, the Organ of
Consultation not only encouraged further noncompliance with Res-
olution I of 1964, but also ignored a decision of its own which was,
and still is, in effect.
XIII. RECAPITULATION AND CONCLUDING COMMENTS
The origins of the Rio Treaty do not lie in its immediate ante-
cedents, such as the 1936 Buenos Aires Conference where the con-
sultation procedure was created at the initiative of Franklin D.
Roosevelt and was put to use during the Second World War.
Rather, the Treaty's roots are found in the treaty signed at the
Congress of Panama in 1826, as well as other 19th century treaties
which reflected Simon Bolivar's concern over European domina-
tion. 22 The mechanisms are valuable antecedents of the modern-
121. APPLICATIONS III, supra note 46, at 85.
122. See supra p. 3.
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day systems for collective security. These 19th Century treaties are
among the most important Latin American contributions to the
development of international law and organizations. The central
point, however, is that the first collective security systems arose in
order to counteract extracontinental threats.
The Second World War instilled new fears that extracon-
tinental powers would endanger the peace and security of the en-
tire continent. President Roosevelt's initiative, and the subsequent
agreements reached in Buenos Aires, reflected this renewed con-
cern. 123 The consultation procedure created in Buenos Aires was
the first step towards a "multilateralization" of the Monroe Doc-
trine. The Monroe Doctrine was first espoused in 1823 via a unilat-
eral declaration, and since that time it has been interpreted and
applied unilaterally by various Presidents of the United States.
Even before the Panama Congress created its collective security
system, the Monroe Doctrine referred to threats of invasion and
other dangers arising from outside the continent.
The system for the "political defense" of the continent was
established at the first three Meetings of Consultation in order to
counteract Nazi-Fascist subversive activities. An essential part of
this system was its characterization of subversion as an "act of po-
litical aggression" or "aggression of non-military character." Great
efforts were made, both by the League of Nations and later by the
United Nations, to define the term "aggression" and its different
manifestations. Nevertheless, the above concepts of subversion and
indirect aggression were not formally recognized until the United
Nations General Assembly approved Resolution 2131 (XX) in
1965.124
A comprehensive definition of aggression is one of the most
outstanding features of the inter-American system for collective se-
curity as eabodied in both the 1947 Rio Treaty and in the 1948
OAS Charter. Both instruments contemplate "aggression which is
not an armed attack.' 1 25 This separates them from the United Na-
tions Charter, which is silent on the subject. In addition, because
of intense and persistent subversive activities of international com-
munism, activities usually channeled through Cuba, the regional
system grew and strengthened appreciably in order to counter this
123. See supra note 13 and accompanying text.
124. See supra note 86 and accompanying text.
125. See OAS Charter, supra note 40, art. 28; Rio Treaty, supra note 1, art. 6.
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new extracontinental threat. In view of collective measures to be
taken pursuant to the Rio Treaty, the definition of acts constitut-
ing indirect aggression were refined by the Treaty. Principles of
individual and collective self-defense were extended to cover in-
stances of indirect aggression. Even though the United Nation's
Charter and the Rio Treaty permit self-defense in "cases of armed
attack," the Organ of Consultation, through various applications of
the Treaty in response to Cuban subversive activities, authorized
both collective and individual self-defense by any means, including
armed force, in cases of aggression not constituting an armed
attack.
In the areas of aggression and self-defense two significant de-
velopments have taken place in the inter-American collective se-
curity system. In the area of aggression, the definitions of the
forms and modalities that modern-day aggression can adopt have
been perfected. The importance of this development is under-
scored by the fact that even the United Nations had to include
subversion among those acts provided for in Resolution 2131 (XX)
of the General Assembly in order to fill the inexcusable gap in the
Charter.126 The significant development in the area of self-defense
is that now the competent regional organ may not only take defen-
sive measures against armed attack, but also against subversive ac-
tivities. The experience of the last twenty years demonstrates the
ineffectiveness of other measures, such as the sanctions imposed on
Cuba in 1964. It will be remembered that under the Treaty's sys-
tem, and its commitment to reciprocal assistance, self-defense is
not only a right, but also an obligation. Thus, given its juridical
nature, self-defense should become the appropriate vehicle for
counteracting the subversive activities of international communism
at a regional level.
Recent events have led to a further discussion of the new de-
velopments in the institution of self-defense. The recent subversive
activities of Castro-communism have revealed a new modality of
aggression. This new form of aggression consists of using the terri-
tories of friendly American states as warehouses for logistical re-
sources destined for subversion in neighboring countries. The re-
cent experience in Grenada is an eloquent illustration. In slightly
different terms, the experience of Nicaragua is also noteworthy.
Most of the logistical resources that Castro-communism furnishes
126. See supra note 124 and accompanying notes.
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to the Salvadoran guerrillas originates from this republic. It is il-
logical and naive to believe that this new modality of aggression
can be effectively checked if the Organ of Consultation can take
only those measures which the Treaty authorizes in cases in which
aggression does not constitute an armed attack. Moreover, given
the volume of assistance originating from the outside, it is evident
that now, more than ever before, subversive activities warrant re-
course to measures of individual and collective self-defense, includ-
ing the use of armed force, as provided for in the aforementioned
applications of the Rio Treaty.
Some of the more recent applications of the inter-American
system for collective security against subversion should be briefly
recounted. In 1966, the Council of the Organization appointed a
special committee to study the deliberations, conclusions, and pro-
jections of the Tri-Continental Conference. 127 The committee's re-
port to the Council contained conclusions and recommendations to
the effect that measures should beadopted to counteract the polit-
ics of intervention and aggression which had been agreed upon at
the Tri-Continental Conference. The Council of the Organization
also ordered the Special Committee to inform the Council of any
future activities of the organizations created at the Tri-Continental
Conference. This was done in order to maintain strict surveillance
over the security of the continent. The constitutions of the Tri-
Continental Conference and of the organizations which emerged
from it, as well as their projections and activities, were also ex-
amined at the 1967 Meeting of Consultation. This Meeting was
convened at the request of the government of Venezuela because of
the Cuban Government's interventionist policies in the internal af-
fairs of the member-states.
The above applications did not lead to the adoption of any
measures and apparently did not result in anything positive. With
respect to the Tri-Continental Conference, the Meeting of Consul-
tation limited itself merely to making nonbinding recommenda-
tions to the governments of the member-states, even though the
Special Committee's report contained a number of serious denun-
ciations. The Meeting suggested that the member-states apply the
recommendations contained in the Special Committee's report.
With respect to Venezuela's allegations concerning Cuban inter-
vention, the Meeting merely resolved "[t]o condemn emphatically
127. See supra pp. 19-21 and accompanying notes.
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the present government of Cuba for its repeated acts of aggression
and intervention against Venezuela and for its persistent policy of
intervention in the internal affairs of Bolivia and of other Ameri-
can states."'2
It is true that the 1967 Meeting was convened pursuant to the
OAS Charter and not by invoking the Treaty. Thus, the Meeting
lacked the requisite competence to take collective measures to
maintain peace and security on the continent. Nonetheless, the
Meeting had the power to establish a regional surveillance mecha-
nism to observe any subversive activities arising from the Tri-Con-
tinental Conference. In this regard, the Meeting of Consultation
left an inexcusable gap in the system for security against subver-
sion. This gap has never been filled. The Meeting's recommenda-
tions to the non-member states to curb their financial and com-
mercial operations with Cuba and to restrict air and marine
transportation to that country have met with no success. Also, the
recommendation that member-states notify the competent organ
of the United Nations about any Cuban violation of General As-
sembly Resolution 2131 (XX) has met with little success.'29
The applications of the inter-American system for security
against subversion are symptoms evidencing the process of its pro-
gressive decline. This process originally began in 1964 with the uni-
lateral non-compliance of the decision of the Organ of Consulta-
tion to impose diplomatic and commercial sanctions on Cuba.
As previously noted, the first such noncompliance came from
the government of Mexico which refused to comply with the Organ
of Consultation's decision, because in its view, the Rio Treaty
"[did] not envisage in any part the application of such measures in
situations of the kind and nature dealt with by this Meeting of
Consultation."' 30 Subsequently, other states also offered similar
reasons for noncompliance. These reasons rested upon unilateral
interpretations of the Treaty. Such interpretations obviously can-
not authorize or justify a refusal to comply with the obligations
resulting from the application of the Treaty. Thus, the GAS in-
curred a grave responsibility because it permitted these first indi-
vidual acts of noncompliance to go unpunished. The fact that
neither the Treaty nor the GAS Charter explicitly provide for a
128. Twelfth Meeting, supra note 80, at 8-9.
129. See supra note 86 and accompanying text.
130. APPLmATIONS HI, supra note 46, at 218-19.
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procedure to be taken by the organs of the OAS in these situations
is no excuse. The "inherent" or "implicit" powers of international
organizations that have been recognized by the International Court
of Justice, and that have been used by the GAS in other circum-
stances, can well be used to cure this defect in the OAS Charter.
In addition to permitting acts of noncompliance by the mem-
ber-states, the GAS is also responsible for allowing new member-
states into the organization without first requiring them to sign
and ratify the Rio Treaty. Article 6 of the GAS's Charter and the
legislative history of the article implicitly mandate this action.131
Moreover, given the institutional integration of the Rio Treaty and
the Charter, failure to precondition membership on ratification
creates a political and judicial anomaly, where the new member-
states do not have the same rights and obligations as the old mem-
ber- states. This anomaly has manifested itself in several events.
For example, a new member-state was admitted into the GAS
while it was still carrying on diplomatic and consular relations with
Cuba. The prime ministers of the new member-states formally de-
clared that they were not bound by decisions prior to their admit-
tance into the OAS. These prime ministers also formally declared
that they would seek the re-establishment of relations with Cuba
by "exercising their sovereign right to enter into relations with any
other sovereign state."1 32
Acquiescence to such statements by other member-states illus-
trates the passive attitude adopted when confronted with a point
of view which is incompatible with the inter-American system for
collective security. Noncompliance with the decisions of the Organ
of Consultation culminated when the Organ of Consultation itself
did not follow its own 1964 decision. The Peruvian initiatives in
1971 and 1972 to normalize relations with Cuba were unsuccessful,
as were the similar efforts of the governments of Colombia, Costa
Rica and Venezuela in Quito in 1974.133 Finally, in 1975, in San
131. The text of article 6 of the Charter of the Organization of American States states:
Any other independent American State that desires to become a Member of the
Organization should so indicate by means of a note addressed to the Secretary
General, in which it declares that it is willing to accept all the obligations inher-
ent in membership, especially those relating to collective security expressly set
forth in articles 27 and 28 of the Charter.
Rio Treaty, supra note 7, art. 6.
132. Letter from the Prime Ministers of Barbados, Guyana, Jamaica, and Trinidad and
Tobago to His Excellency Dr. Galo Plaza, Secretary General of the Organization of Ameri-
can States (Oct. 13, 1972).
133. See supra p. 28-31.
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Jose, the countries urging normalization of relations with Cuba ob-
tained a majority to carry out this objective. Part of this majority
was made up of countries which merely did not object to normali-
zation of relations. This majority was obtained through a resolu-
tion which, in a pure juridical sense, did not revoke the 1964 deci-
sion. The 1975 Resolution did, however, expressly authorize the
member-states to "normalize or conduct, in accordance with the
national policy and interest of each, their relations with the Re-
public of Cuba at the level and in the form that each state deems
advisable."' 4 In this manner, not only did the Organ of Consulta-
tion encourage new individual acts of noncompliance, but it also
failed to comply with its own decision which remained, and still
remains, in effect. Resolution I of 1964 lost its effectiveness
through a series of successive acts of individual noncompliance.
The final blow came due to actions of the Organ of Consultation.
The 1964 Resolution was not invalidated; instead, it was
emasculated.
The responsibility incurred by the Organ of Consultation in
San Jose is graver in light of the circumstances surrounding the
adoption of the 1975 Resolution. This resolution was adopted
somewhat precipitously, thus bypassing the condition stated in
paragraph 4 of the 1964 Resolution, which required that the sanc-
tions against Cuba be lifted when and if the Cuban government
"ceased to constitute a danger to the peace and security of the
hemisphere."'' 13 In this regard, it should be recalled that the 1975
Meeting of Consultation paid no attention to the denunciations of
continued Cuban intervention and subversion. The proof
presented by the Uruguayan Chancellor on this point was largely
ignored. At the meeting the majority assumed the same attitude,
passing over a Chilean proposal to have one of the entities of the
inter-American collective security system investigate the denuncia-
tions prior to any decision making. None of the delegations form-
ing this majority claimed that Cuba had ceased to be a danger to
the peace and security of the continent. These delegations merely
reiterated the arguments that Peru had made to the Permanent
Council in 1971 and 1972 that the measures imposed on Cuba had
become anachronistic, inefficient, and inconvenient given the fact
that they were imposed during "political conditions totally differ-
134. APPLICATIONS HI, supra note 46, at 81.
135. APPLICATmONS II, supra note 46, at 216.
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ent from those that prevail in the world today. '136 The twelve-
country declaration made in Quito espoused this sentiment. These
considerations - apparently also shared by the other countries
which voted in favor of the San Jose Resolution - were invoked to
justify the adoption of the Resolution. Thus, the responsibility in-
curred by the Organ of Consultation is inexcusable: the so-called
East-West detente was only a political phenomenon, more appar-
ent than real. In any event, detente was a stage in contemporary
international relations in which subversive activities originating
from outside the continent intensified considerably and visibly.
Noncompliance with decisions of the Organ of Consultation is
the most visible manifestation of the crisis of the Rio Treaty. An-
other manifestation of the crisis occurred during the process of
amending the Treaty. The amendments were incorporated in the
San Jose Protocol. As previously noted, the Treaty reform, as well
as the general restructuring of the inter-American collective secur-
ity system, were undertaken in order to ensure that the system
would adequately respond to "the new political, economic, social,
and cultural [conditions] in all the member-states and to hemi-
sphere and world conditions.' '1 37
The noteworthy similarity between these considerations and
the considerations that led to the 1975 Resolution on Cuba, which
was adopted only days later in San Jose, translated into a substan-
tial reform of article 6 that refers to acts, facts, or situations not
constituting an armed attack. The amendments contained in arti-
cle 6 consisted of eliminating the phrase "aggression which is not
an armed attack" without replacing it with another phrase to cover
indirect aggression or subversion. Amendments to article 9 were
consistent with the reform to article 6. Thus, when the Protocol is
in effect the Organ of Consultation can no longer characterize acts
of aggression other than those which involve the "use of armed
force" pursuant to the Treaty.'38
Expounding further on the close similarity between the con-
siderations and motives which led to the 1975 Resolution on Cuba
and those which inspired the amendments to the Treaty, it should
be noted that at the San Jose Conference the argument was re-
peatedly made that the expression "aggression which is not an
136. Fifteenth Meeting, supra note 114, at 12.
137. Final Report, supra note 91, at 96.
138. See supra pp. 12-15 and accompanying notes.
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armed attack" was too vague. Thus, to the detriment of some of
the states, this vague expression could cause the application of the
Treaty to occur for purely political or ideological reasons.
The crisis within the Treaty has also manifested itself through
non-application of the Treaty in certain situations, as well as
through unjustified application in other areas. The Central Ameri-
can subregion exemplifies both of these propositions. With regard
to unjustified applications of the Treaty, the intervention of the
Organ of Consultation leaves much to be desired, especially in view
of its duty to maintain peace and security in the countries of the
area. From the point of view of peace and security, one important
fact in particular was ignored which was of fundamental impor-
tance. Because of its long and strategic border with Nicaragua, the
territory of Costa Rica was used to penetrate Nicaragua with heav-
ily armed and equipped combatants of several nationalities. Costa
Rica was also used to furnish the combatants with logistical sup-
port and served as a refuge. What explanation is there for the fact
that the Organ of Consultation did not perceive this notorious and
well-planned act of aggression by international communist forces
that was carried out with the direct and open help from Cuba?
The reason this constitutes an unjustified application of the Rio
Treaty is that the Treaty was applied for a different purpose than
that provided for in the Treaty itself. In addition, this application
indirectly contributed to the installation of international commu-
nism within the American continental territory.
Such unjustified application of the Treaty could have been
overcome when the character of the new Nicaraguan regime and its
close ties with Cuba were completely exposed. The Seventeenth
Meeting of Consultation of the Ministers of Foreign Affairs in 1979
should have required the new regime to abide by its formal obliga-
tion.139 These obligations included the installation of a democratic
government to be composed of the principal groups which had op-
posed the previous regime and the guarantee to respect the human
rights of all Nicaraguans, without exception. The requirements im-
posed by the Meeting were not unexpected, especially in view of
the Resolution of June 23, 1979 which proposed the "[ilmmediate
and definitive replacement of the Somoza regime" in order to re-
solve the situation in Nicaragua.
139. See the complete text of Resolution II of the Seventeenth Meeting of Consultation
in AMARIO JURIDICO INTER-AmERIcANo 1979 (Organizaci6n de Estados Americanos 1979).
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Non-application of the Treaty is also unjustifiable. Should not
the Treaty mechanisms be set in motion in order to counteract the
intense subversive activities carried out by Castro-communism in
El Salvador, and channeled through the territory of Nicaragua? As
provided in article 6 of the Treaty, facts or situations of the type
prescribed there require that "the Organ of Consultation. .. meet
immediately in order to agree on . . measures . *.". . o Does this
mean that the conditions which justify and require the application
of the Treaty to the face of new extra-continental threats have not
yet been met? In circumstances of far less seriousness, such as the
acts of aggression and intervention into Venezuela's internal af-
fairs, did not the Organ of Consultation meet in 1964 to impose
sanctions on Cuba?
Still another manifestation of the crisis within the Treaty is
the present inclination of certain American states to seek recourse
from the competent organs of the United Nations. In the United
Nations Charter, the Treaty, and other inter-American documents,
recourse to the United Nations is a right retained by the states
that are members of a regional organism. This right has never been
disputed. One of the amendments to the Treaty, however, clearly
evidences the trend to strengthen the liberty of action that such
member-states enjoy. This trend would weaken the obligation im-
posed by the United Nations Charter on the member-states to
make "every effort to achieve specific settlement of local dis-
putes ' 141 via regional organizations. This trend has not yet devel-
oped in the area of self-defense. Nonetheless, it is conceivable that
this trend could one day affect the rights and obligations of the
member-states in the exercise of self-defense pursuant to the
Treaty, the OAS Charter, and even the Charter of the United
Nations.
There is a remarkable contrast between this new position and
the position maintained by the Latin American countries in order
to secure autonomy for the regional security system. Autonomy
with respect to measures implying the use of armed force was ob-
tained through the institution of self-defense. Previous reforms to
the Treaty do not affect the exercise of self-defense in its form or
in its reach. Undoubtedly, the present visible inclination in favor
of global mechanisms may at any moment have an unfavorable ef-
140. See also supra p. 12.
141. U.N. CHARTER art. 52, para. 2.
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fect in the adoption of individual or collective self-defense deemed
necessary to repel an act of aggression regardless of whether it is of
extra or intra-continental origin.
It becomes clear from the preceding statements that the Rio
Treaty is facing a genuine and serious crisis. However deplorable,
it must be recognized that noncompliance with the decisions of the
Regional Organ of Consultation has undermined the political and
juridical authority of the Treaty. The unjustified application of the
Treaty to the Nicaraguan situation in 1979 and its inexcusable
non-application to the case of El Salvador also augment the crisis.
These facts taken together reveal that the Rio Treaty, because of
the political inclinations of some countries and the political apathy
of many others, has ceased to respond to the primordial purpose of
the inter-American collective security system, namely, to counter-
act extra-continental threats. In this respect, it appears that the
historical constant which began with Bolivar has come to an end.
